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Four-year-old Tafida Raqeeb suffered a sudden and catastrophic brain injury resulting from a 
rare condition. UK doctors would not agree to a transfer of Tafida to a hospital in Italy in 
circumstances that they considered to be contrary to her best interests. Her parents applied for 
judicial review of the hospital decision and the hospital Trust applied for a determination of 
Tafida’s best interests. The cases were heard together. The High Court ruled that Tafida could 
be taken to Italy for treatment. Applying the best interests test, Mr Justice MacDonald found 
that Tafida was not in pain and ongoing treatment would not be a burden to her. Further 
treatment would comply with the religious beliefs of her parents. The case is specific to its 
facts, but MacDonald J’s interpretation of the best interests test is likely to have implications. 
In particular, we explore the separation of medical and overall best interests; the recognition of 
the relevance of international laws and frameworks to best interests determinations; and 
reliance not on what Tafida could understand and express but on what she might in future have 
come to believe had she followed her parents’ religious beliefs.  
KEYWORDS 
Best interests, conscience, children, life-sustaining treatment, free movement, parental rights. 
 
THE FACTS AND JUDGMENT 
Tafida Raqeeb was born in 2014 and is now five years old. In February 2019 she had a sudden 
and catastrophic rupture of an arteriovenous malformation that caused substantially irreversible 
damage to her brain. When the team at Royal London Hospital, which is part of Barts Health 
NHS Trust, recommended that further treatment was contrary to Tafida’s best interests, the 
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parents contacted other hospitals around the world. Gaslini Paediatric Hospital in Genoa 
reviewed the case and accepted a transfer request, but the team at Barts would not agree to the 
transfer in circumstances where they believed it to be contrary to Tafida’s best interests. The 
hospital issued proceedings in the High Court under the Children Act 1989 and inherent 
jurisdiction. Concurrently, the parents sought judicial review of the Trust’s decision to block 
Tafida’s medical treatment in another EU Member State, claiming that it breached Article 56 
of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union on provision and receipt of services.  
 
Mr Justice MacDonald dealt first with the matter of the judicial review. He held that the 
decision to deny transfer to Italy was amenable to judicial review, notwithstanding that the 
Trust had sought a determination of Tafida’s best interests from the court. Furthermore the 
Trust’s decision was prima facie unlawful, as it failed to follow the procedure set down in R v 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ex parte Blood.1 However, because the 
interference with free movement rights would have been a justified and proportionate 
interference (had this been duly considered by the Trust) given the established national 
procedure for settling best interests disputes,2 MacDonald J declined to quash the unlawful 
decision: a remedy that would serve no practical purpose in this case.3 The decision has 
implications in relation to the availability of judicial review more generally. It also raises 
complex issues around compliance with free movement rights in future cases, including around 
how and when UK hospitals should share information and otherwise cooperate with hospitals 
across the EU. We do not deal with them here.  
 
This casenote focuses on the second aspect of the judgment: the determination under the 
Children Act 1989 and inherent jurisdiction of the court. MacDonald J confirmed that disputes 
of this nature must come before the court.4 In his ‘very finely balanced’ decision,5 he held that 
it was not appropriate on the facts to give the declaration sought by the Trust that treatment 
should be discontinued. The Trust declined to appeal.6 This is not the first time a court has 
declined to give such a declaration,7 and each case is decided on its particular facts. Our focus 
is not on the outcome of the case: it has been reported that, to the great relief of her family, 
Tafida has been successfully moved to Italy for the next stage of her treatment.8 Rather, we 
comment on the articulation of the best interests test in this case, which is likely to have 
implications in both clinical practice and court.  
 
THE REASONING 
                                                     
1 [1999] Fam 151. [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam), [155]. 
2 Barts Health NHS Trust v Raqeeb [2019] EWHC 2530 (Fam); Raqeeb and Barts Health NHS Trust [2019] EWHC 
2531 (Admin), [146]-[154]. (Raqeeb). 
3 ibid [156]-[158]. 
4 ibid [105]-[109]. 
5 ibid [185]. 
6 Barts Health NHS Trust, Media statement regarding our care of Tafida Raqeeb, 4 October 2019 
https://www.bartshealth.nhs.uk/news/media-statement-regarding-our-care-of-tafida-raqeeb-6626  
7 See An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam). 
8 BBC News, ‘Tafida Raqeeb: Brain-damaged girl arrives in Italy’ 16 October 2019 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-50068246  
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MacDonald J also presided over the case of Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v 
Haastrup in 2018. In that case, he granted the order sought by the Trust that it was in the best 
interests of 11-month-old Isaiah Haastrup that treatment be withdrawn. In cases of this nature, 
as MacDonald J made clear in Haastrup:  
 
The paramount consideration is the best interests of the child. The role of the court 
when exercising its jurisdiction is to take over the parents' duty to give or withhold 
consent in the best interests of the child. It is the role and duty of the court to do so and 
to exercise its own independent and objective judgment.9  
 
The first consideration was Tafida’s current medical condition and prognosis. Tafida has a 
prolonged disorder of consciousness. Evidence was presented that in the paediatric context, the 
distinction between vegetative state and minimally conscious state is ‘somewhat artificial’ and 
MacDonald J accepted that ‘there is a consensus of medical opinion is (sic) that it is not possible 
to exclude in Tafida some level of conscious awareness’.10 It was found that she is unlikely to 
feel pain ‘at least in her resting state or standard condition’.11 Transfer to Italy would be of 
minimal risk and the team at Gaslini Hospital were fully appraised of the situation and of 
excellent repute.  
 
As for prognosis, there was a possibility that Tafida might be given a tracheostomy in Italy and 
returned to the UK to be cared for at home. The Italian team said that there was potential for 
her to be weaned from mechanical ventilation. Provided life-sustaining treatment was 
continued, she would be likely to live between 10-20 years. It was recognised that her physical 
condition would likely deteriorate in this time, to include problems such as drug resistant 
epilepsy, scoliosis, hip dislocation, pneumonia, bone disease, renal stones and pressure sores.12 
It was also considered possible that she might regain a (greater) level of awareness. MacDonald 
J accepted the view of the Trust that her medical condition and prognosis comprised: 
 
a bare situation of continued life likely, but not certainly, pain free but in a situation of 
minimal or no awareness, with no hope of recovery and the certain prospect of 
developing further debilitating conditions, which with any improvement in awareness 
will further burden Tafida.13  
 
MacDonald J concluded that: ‘On the evidence, this is an accurate but as I will come to, 
incomplete formulation’.14 Turning to consideration of her overall best interests, MacDonald J 
noted that other children are treated in the UK with long term ventilation and the treatment 
offered by the Gaslini hospital would continue the care given by the Trust rather than depart 
radically from it. Tafida was being raised within the Islamic religious tradition and had begun 
                                                     
9 Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Haastrup [2018] 2 FLR 1028, [69]. (Haastrup). 
10 Raqeeb (n 2) [161]. 
11 ibid [162]. 
12 ibid [34], [163]. 
13 ibid [167]. 
14 ibid [167]. 
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to understand and adhere to the faith.15 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) applies even to young children, and this right is to be given weight, though it was not 
determinative, given derogations under Article 9(2).16 MacDonald J concluded that, taking into 
consideration the care Tafida would receive from her family, signs of her religious commitment 
and open and caring attitude to those with disabilities, the benefits to her of continued treatment 
outweighed the burdens.17  
 
The views of her parents - Shelina Begum and Mohammed Abdul Raqeeb - were highly 
relevant to the best interests determination. They had obtained a fatwa restating the principle 
of sanctity of life. Though Article 8 of the ECHR was not relied upon to a great extent in 
submissions and is trumped by the best interests of the child, MacDonald J considered that 
overriding the parental choice might interfere with Article 8 ECHR protecting private and 
family life in light of his best interest determination.18  
 
In both Raqeeb and the earlier case of Haastrup, MacDonald J confirmed that: 
 
There will be cases where it is not in the best interests of the child to subject him or her 
to treatment that will cause increased suffering and produce no commensurate benefit, 
giving the fullest possible weight to the child’s and mankind’s desire to survive.19 
 
On the facts, the judge found that Haastrup fell within this bracket and Raqeeb did not. The 
Raqeeb judgment restates the best interest test but applies it in a novel way which has 
potentially far reaching implications. In the following two sections we argue that the 
application of the test in Raqeeb protects parental choice in an unprecedented manner. We then 
explore the implications of the decision for the medical profession. 
 
THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS OR PARENTAL RIGHTS? 
I. JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF MEDICAL BEST INTERESTS 
The judge held that the Trust had framed best interests too narrowly. As we shall argue, the 
wider framing focused predominantly on Tafida’s interests in upholding her and 
(controversially, we will argue) her parents’ religious preferences as to the sanctity of life. 
There was also a wider medical consideration that the court found persuasive: the potential for 
Tafida to be cared for at hospital or home on long term ventilation (LTV) in common with 
others in a similar position.20 This was decided notwithstanding counsel for the NHS Trust, Ms 
Gollop’s, argument that there is insufficient evidence regarding the position of other children 
on LTV or as to whether or not Tafida’s situation is comparable.21 Cases of LTV are growing 
in number and there is recognition of the need for clear guidance for HCPs as to when LTV is 
                                                     
15 ibid [76]. 
16 ibid [184]. 
17 ibid [168]. 
18 ibid [182]. 
19 ibid [186]; Haastrup (n 9) [69].  
20 Raqeeb (n 2) [168]. 
21 ibid [73]. 
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in a child’s best interests.22 In the absence of such guidance, inconsistencies in its use may have 
arisen, and reliance on the mere fact that LTV occurs is ethically dubious if some of those cases 
might contravene the best interests of children.  
 
As for the clinical factors set out by the Trust, it is notable that little weight was placed on the 
potential for current and future burden to Tafida. The Children’s Guardian, who argued that 
treatment was not in Tafida’s best interests,23 was concerned that the possibility that Tafida 
feels pain cannot be excluded. MacDonald J was sceptical given that the standard of proof is 
the balance of probabilities.24 As to future burdens, which are relevant according to section 
1(3)(e) of the Children Act 1989, the Trust argued they could be significant based on Tafida’s 
inevitable physical deterioration and potential for heightened awareness. Tafida was thought 
to react to intense painful stimulation, though no changes to the EEG were visible.25 Cases are 
fact-specific and medical considerations are but one of a number, but for parents and HCPs 
trying to work out how much weight to give to a child’s potential pain, comparison with dicta 
in Haastrup might cause puzzlement. In that case the potential for pain was given greater 
weight, though there was no external or objective evidence that Isaiah felt pain.26 MacDonald 
J stated there that: 
 
Isaiah's likely attitude to treatment must also be evaluated against the fact that the 
prospect facing him is one of continued life sustaining treatment that will do not more 
than sustain him in, at best, a state of profoundly depressed consciousness in which, if 
he is aware, he is more likely than not only to be minimally so, with no prospect of 
improvement or recovery and the prospect of repeated chest infections, deformity 
scoliosis and hip dislocation. Within this context, … I am satisfied that Isaiah's point of 
view would be that treatment … would be very unlikely to be acceptable to him, 
particularly if he is feeling pain.27 
 
Returning to Raqeeb, the court offset potential future burdens against medical (as well as social 
and religious) benefits: in particular Tafida’s potential to breathe without mechanical support. 
But the court acknowledges that there is no evidence that this will be achieved: 
 
Whilst there is consensus that Tafida is currently unable to breath without mechanical 
support, and the doctors in this jurisdiction are sceptical that this position will ever 
change, the Italian doctors consider that the question of whether Tafida could be 
weaned off a ventilator following a tracheostomy requires further, detailed evaluation.28 
 
                                                     
22 S Ray, J Brierley, A Bush, et al ‘Towards developing an ethical framework for decision making in long-term 
ventilation in children’ (2018) 103 Archives of Disease in Childhood 1080. 
23 Raqeeb (n 2) [82]. 
24 ibid [175]. 
25 ibid [23]. 
26 Haastrup (n 9) [37]. 
27 ibid [100]. 
28 Raqeeb (n 2) [26]. 
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The Italian team were not expressing a view that weaning Tafida from mechanical ventilation 
is likely, but that it is a matter that requires ‘detailed evaluation’. As such, on the same balance 
of probabilities argument that mitigated against consideration of potential current and future 
pain, the potential to wean Tafida from mechanical ventilation was of questionable value as a 
perceived benefit. 
 
II PARENTAL RIGHTS BY THE BACK DOOR? 
If we accept evidence that Tafida does not and will not suffer pain and is of insufficient 
consciousness to suffer burden from her existence, another issue is raised by the assumption 
that Tafida’s interests are defined by her parents’ cultural and religious beliefs.   
 
In his assertions that life was worthwhile from Tafida’s point of view, MacDonald J 
acknowledged that Tafida was unlikely to have had any concept of her current situation before 
her catastrophic injury. What was significant was that: 
 
It is plain on that evidence that Tafida had a growing understanding of the practices of 
Islam, had developed a concept of the importance of life and an accepting and non-
judgmental approach to those with disability.29  
 
The significance of religion to four-year-old Tafida is exaggerated. She lacked a deep 
understanding or adherence to religion and could not have understood the implications of living 
on with limited or no awareness as her body deteriorated. MacDonald J is thus clear that:  
as fairly conceded by the mother, given Tafida’s age and understanding, I am also 
satisfied that she would have had in February 2019 no concept or contemplation of her 
current situation, or of the complex and grave legal, moral and ethical issues it raises.30 
He adds that ‘it would be unsafe to infer from the available evidence an acceptance by Tafida 
of, or wish to live’ ‘a life of minimal awareness with no prospect of substantive recovery’.31 
Yet he draws from these clear statements of Tafida’s very limited understanding of her situation 
and what her wishes might be for treatment the following summary: 
if Tafida was asked she would not reject out of hand a situation in which she continued 
to live, albeit in a moribund and at best minimally conscious state, without pain and in 
the loving care of her dedicated family, consistent with her formative appreciation that 
life is precious, a wish to follow a parent’s religious practice and a non-judgmental 
attitude to disability.32 
 
What would not be rejected ‘out of hand’ is not the situation that it is admitted she barely if at 
all grasped, but a continued existence whose significance lies in an ‘appreciation that life is 
precious’. Such an appreciation is essentially that of her parents, and is only ‘formative’ on her 
                                                     
29 ibid [166]. 
30 ibid [166]. 
31 ibid [167]. 
32 ibid [168]. 
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part. But what can it mean to say that it is ‘formative?’ It seems to be ambiguous between 
‘already partially formed,’ ‘being formed,’ and ‘would have been formed’. From the evidence 
it can only mean that she would have grown up to share her parents’ religious views and culture. 
She might indeed have formed such an outlook, but it was barely if at all formed as matters 
stood when her understanding of her situation was appraised.  
 
It would seem then that what was judged to be best for Tafida was what cohered with the deeply 
held religious beliefs of her parents. MacDonald J stated that life sustaining treatment was a 
benefit for Tafida and thus an important element of what was in her interests because:  
 
it permits Tafida to remain alive in accordance with the tenets of the religion in which 
she was being raised.33 
 
That such treatment ‘is consistent with the religious and cultural tenets by which Tafida was 
being raised’ was what, in MacDonald J’s view, clearly tipped the balance towards seeing her 
best interests as served by according ‘in the final analysis’ the choice of what shall be done to 
her parents.34 
 
The importance given to ‘religious and cultural tenets’ in the assessment of Tafida’s best 
interests sits oddly with the final statement of MacDonald J: 
 
Absent the fact of pain or the awareness of suffering, the answer to the objective best 
interests tests must be looked for in subjective or highly value laden ethical, moral or 
religious factors extrinsic to the child, such as futility (in its non-technical sense), 
dignity, the meaning of life and the principle of the sanctity of life, which factors mean 
different things to different people in a diverse, multicultural, multifaith society.35 
 
The claim made here appears to be that there is no right or objective answer to what is in a 
child’s interests, only ‘subjective’ judgments that derive from the diverse outlooks of different 
communities in our society. If this is the claim being made it conflates a factual and true 
assertion concerning the existence of moral disagreement in society from a philosophical claim 
about the plurality or relativity of moral value. This latter claim is deeply contentious and 
would indeed be disputed by most philosophers. Moreover, the fact that citizens do disagree 
morally about important matters – such as the value of dignity or the sanctity of life – does not 
discharge the court from its fundamental obligation to determine what in its view is objectively 
in the child’s best interests.36  Making such a determination, where it disagrees with the deeply 
and sincerely held views of parents, is not to show disrespect to those views nor the culture and 
religion from which they derive.  
 
                                                     
33 ibid [173]. 
34 ibid [182]. 
35 ibid [191]. 
36 On which see Haastrup (n 9) [69], per MacDonald J. 
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The centrality to the judgment of religious views about the sanctity of life is not acknowledged 
in the rapid responses by two commentators on the case, Dominic Wilkinson and Julian 
Savulescu, published by the Science Media Centre soon after the judgment was released.37 
Indeed, Savulescu states that the issue is not about religion but justice, and that decisions about 
continued treatment should be best made on grounds of distributive justice, not on grounds of 
a human being better off dead. This is curious given the published views of both authors in 
their recent book.38 There they state:  
 
For example, a person might request that mechanical ventilation be continued because 
he believes that we should not intervene in God’s will. Such beliefs are arguably 
irrational.39 
 
Later they state that ‘a reasonable view about treatment cannot be justified on the basis of 
reasons that are judged to be unacceptable by wider society’40 and make that applicable to the 
current context by adding: 
In the UK (and in other countries, such as France), societies have come to the stronger 
conclusion that there are situations where life should not be prolonged even if the 
patient would have wanted treatment to continue, or the family are requesting that 
treatment. In those societies, it would not make any sense to count in favour of the 
reasonableness of providing treatment a view based on a strong sanctity of life ethic.41 
It would seem that on their published view at least, the beliefs of Tafida’s parents are ‘arguably 
irrational’ and anyway should not be counted as reasonable in the UK. 
 
As Emily Jackson stated in her own rapid response published by the Science Media Centre, 
because the judge found that Tafida was not in pain and ongoing treatment would not be a 
burden to her, ‘[he] ruled the decision could be taken by her parents, in the light of their 
religious beliefs about the sanctity of human life’.42 The legal basis for this position is not 
explored in the judgment, which is reconcilable with the view that parental choice should be 
protected provided it does not cause the patient significant harm. Indeed, Tafida’s parents have 
since called for a change in the law so that hospitals should be unable to block requests to 
transfer children to reputable hospitals.43 This builds on related arguments following the 
                                                     
37 Science Media Centre, Expert reaction to Tafida Raqeeb ruling from High Court (3 October 2019) 
https://www.sciencemediacentre.org/expert-reaction-to-tafida-raqeeb-ruling-from-high-court/.  
38 D Wilkinson and J Savulescu, Ethics, Conflict and Medical Treatment for Children (London: Elsevier, 2019). 
39 ibid 88-89. 
40 ibid 112. 
41 ibid 113. 
42 Science Media Centre (n 37). And see Raqeeb (n 2) [182].  
43 BBC News, ‘Tafida Raqeeb: 'Law should be revisited', say parents’ 5 October 2019 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-49944602 . 
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Evans44 and Gard45 cases. But the significant harm test was firmly rejected in Gard,46 and the 
position on parental preferences set out by Holman J in An NHS Trust v MB remains good law:  
 
Their own wishes, however understandable in human terms, are wholly irrelevant to 
consideration of the objective best interests of the child save to the extent in any given 
case that they may illuminate the quality and value to the child of the child/parent 
relationship.47 
 
A more likely possibility is that MacDonald J sought to align the decision with McFarlane LJ’s 
interpretation of Re King48 in Gard. There, McFarlane LJ said:  
 
[I]n the end it is the judge who has to choose the best course for a child.  Where, as in 
the case of Re King before Mr Justice Baker, there really was nothing to choose as 
between the benefits and detriments of the two forms of radiotherapy, the court readily 
stood back and allowed the parents to make their choice.49 
 
What made the Raqeeb case so finely balanced for MacDonald J was the close alignment of 
Tafida’s and her parents’ interests, which we have argued is problematic in this case. Some 
will celebrate the fact that, notwithstanding recent decisions in Haastrup,50 Gard51 and Evans52 
to grant the declarations sought by the relevant Trusts to withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
from children, MacDonald J makes clear in Raqeeb that medical considerations can be trumped 
by weightier factors. This has long been thus, but the Raqeeb case gives a consideration to 
parental preferences that blurs the distinction between the child’s point of view and that of her 
parents.  
 
THE ROLE OF HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS IN BEST INTERESTS 
DECISION-MAKING POST RAQEEB 
HCPs have scope to accommodate parental choice in their consideration of a child’s best 
interests when making an assessment of overall best interests.53 The impact of factors such as 
disagreement, non-compliance, or a parent moving their child to another provider on the well-
being of the child legitimately factors into their overall assessment of what plan is best for the 
child. As a result, an agreed course of action may not be clinically optimal. However, HCPs 
                                                     
44 ITV News, ‘MEP Launching Campaign for ‘Alfie’s Law’ to Give Parents More Say’ 26 April 2018 
http://www.itv.com/news/granada/2018-04-26/mep-launching-campaign-for-alfies-law-togive-parents-more-
say/.  
45 Charlie Gard Foundation, Charlie’s Law: https://www.thecharliegardfoundation. org/charlies-law/. 
46 Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v Yates and others [2017] EWCA Civ 410, 
[105]. 
47 An NHS Trust v MB (n 7) and see endorsement in Re A (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 759. 
48 Re King [2014] EWHC 2964 (Fam). 
49 Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v Yates and others (n 46) [96]. 
50 Haastrup (n 9). 
51 Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v Yates and others (n 46). 
52 Evans v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust [2018] 2 FLR 1269. 
53 See discussion in E Cave, E Nottingham, ‘Who knows best (interests)? The case of Charlie Gard (2018) 26(3) 
Med LR 500. 
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can only accommodate parental preferences to the extent that this would not conflict with their 
professional obligations to protect the best interests of the child. As Jo Bridgman argues, most 
decisions about continuation of life-sustaining treatment are ‘only referred to court where the 
clinicians, supported by second opinions and in accordance with professional guidance have 
reached the limits of what is professionally conscionable’.54 Bridgman explains that the 
predominance of cases in which judges agree with HCPs rather than parents reflects their 
respect for professional obligations rather than deference to the medical profession.55  
 
 
I. MEDICAL OR OVERALL BEST INTERESTS? 
Professional obligations should guide HCPs as to the extent to which they are prepared to 
accommodate parental preferences in the interests of the child. Raqeeb raises questions as to 
what approach was taken by the treating HCPs. It is not clear whether they took an entirely 
medical conception of best interests or made an assessment of overall interests but concluded 
that the clinical factors were of such magnitude that treatment would conflict with professional 
obligations. In either scenario, the HCPs’ best interests assessment is subject to independent 
review by the court, but in the former case the court would be correcting a misapplication of 
the best interests test and in the latter case the court would be overruling the Trust’s conception 
of professional obligations. Whilst either approach is open to the court, opacity could lead to 
misinterpretation.  
 
The judgment refers several times to ‘medical best interests’56 in contrast to overall best 
interests. It is possible that the ‘entirely medical perspective’57 of the Trust flowed from their 
application of a ‘medical best interests’ test and either this was in error because they should 
have applied a wider best interests test (which we consider below) or this approach was 
understandable given their expertise, but is not the approach that is to be taken by the court. 
The latter would be troublesome on two levels. Firstly, it does not accord with the Supreme 
Court judgment in Aintree v James (in the context of an adult patient lacking capacity), that the 
role of decision makers is to consider best interests widely from the position of the patient.58 
Where the decision-maker is a doctor, professional guidance from the General Medical Council 
urges them to look beyond clinical factors when assessing best interests.59 
 
Secondly, it would be problematic because perpetuation of a medical best interests test would 
lead to decisions from HCPs that do not fully reflect the wishes and preferences of the 
                                                     
54 J Bridgeman, ‘Beyond best interests: A question of professional conscience?’, 138 in I Goold, J Herring, C 
Auckland (eds) Parental Rights, Best Interests and Significant Harms: Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of 
Children Post Great Ormand Street Hospital v Gard (Hart, 2019). 
55 ibid 151. 
56 Raqeeb (n 2) [1], [18], [35], [178]. 
57 ibid [75]. 
58 Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [39] per Lady Hale. 
59 GMC, 0-18: Guidance for all doctors (2007, updated 2018), paras 12 and 13 https://www.gmc-uk.org/ethical-
guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/0-18-years/assessing-best-interests; GMC, Treatment and care towards 
the end of life: good practice in decision making (2010), para 13 (‘Overall benefit’), para 92 https://www.gmc-
uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-doctors/treatment-and-care-towards-the-end-of-life.  
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individual patient, or at least to perceptions from patients that this is the case. It could lead to 
a significant increase in applications to the court. Anecdotal but immediate evidence that this 
risk is tangible flows from the Barts Health NHS Trust media statement following the case 
which states that: 
 
Unfortunately there are sometimes rare situations where an agreement cannot be 
reached, and where the treating team believe that continued treatment is not in the best 
medical interests of a child.   
 
In such situations we are expected to follow the national guidance of the General 
Medical Council, and seek an independent legal view about the overall best interests 
of the child.60 
 
With respect, this position is not an accurate reflection of the law. The treating team should not 
apply a different test (best medical interests) to that applied by the judge (overall best interests). 
Rather, the medical team must accept that their application of the overall best interests test is 
subject to independent oversight by the court. They may be found to have erred in their 
assessment, and they may have more limited ability to reflect on evidence of the wider aspects 
than a court, but neither factor implies that it is acceptable that they apply a wholly different 
test.  
 
Is this what happened in Tafida’s case? Did the Trust make a purely medical best interests 
assessment? If the Trust limited itself to a consideration of clinical factors when assessing best 
interests, then they applied the wrong test and breached professional guidance. As MacDonald 
J asserts, ‘Tafida is more than simply a patient who is the subject of medical treatment’.61 
MacDonald J lamented the overly narrow ‘entirely medical perspective’62 of the Trust, which 
suggests that the wrong test was applied. However, an alternative explanation is that ‘medical 
best interests’ was merely a label for the conclusion reached by the Trust after consideration of 
overall best interests. Clarification would be helpful in light of our suggestion above that it is 
already leading to confusion as to what is the appropriate test.   
 
II. THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS PROFESSIONALLY CONSCIONABLE 
Assuming that the HCPs considered Tafida’s overall interests and concluded that the medical 
factors were such that continued treatment would not be professionally conscionable, the effect 
of the judgment is either to correct that view of what is professionally conscionable, or to render 
professional conscience secondary to other considerations. 
 
The opinion of the treating team was considered by the court to be responsible, but evidence 
that an alternative responsible medical opinion exists was central to the refusal of the Trust’s 
                                                     
60 Barts Health NHS Trust, Media statement regarding our care of Tafida Raqeeb, 4 October 2019 
https://www.bartshealth.nhs.uk/news/media-statement-regarding-our-care-of-tafida-raqeeb-6626 (italics 
added). 
61 Raqeeb (n 2) [172]. 
62 ibid [75]. 
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application. The alternative view was reached in the context of the Italian framework on best 
interests which was relevant because ‘this jurisdiction does not hold the monopoly on legal and 
ethical matters’.63 The grounds for this proposition are not clear. Presumably the absence of a 
monopoly flows from free movement rights within the EU, but EU law does not necessarily 
prevent Member States from adopting a particular ethical position that impacts on free 
movement. For example, Germany did not restrict free movement of goods when it banned 
laser-tagging games: Germany’s ‘monopoly’ on the principle of human dignity was 
protected.64 Furthermore, the statement raises the issue which MacDonald J himself warned 
against in Haastrup:  
 
It would be extremely unfortunate if the standard response to applications of this nature 
was to become one of scouring the world for medical experts who simply take the view 
that the medical, moral or ethical approach to these issues in their jurisdiction, or in 
their own practice is preferable to the medical, moral or ethical approach in this 
jurisdiction. This is particularly so where parents in the situation these parents find 
themselves in are understandably desperate to grasp any apparent life raft in the storm 
that is engulfing them.65 
 
MacDonald J contrasted the Raqeeb case with ‘the clandestine involvement of inappropriately 
qualified foreign medical practitioners’66 in certain recent cases such as Haastrup. 
Furthermore, as referred to above, much was made of the fact that the course of action 
advocated by the Gaslini hospital is often adopted in the UK. But if these factors were central 
to the decision, then the rejection of a ‘monopoly on legal and ethical matters’ seems 
unnecessary, because continuation of life-sustaining treatment was arguably compliant with 
both UK law and ethics. The implication for future cases is that practices that are acceptable in 
reputable institutions abroad (be they to do with maintenance of life, innovative treatment, or 
other issues) should not be rejected merely because they are unlawful or unethical here, 
provided the body of opinion is ‘responsible’. Insofar as the limits of what HCPs consider 
acceptable are controlled by what is professionally conscionable according to UK law and 
professional guidance, Raqeeb suggests that this is too narrow a conception.  
 
Turning now to the implications of the decision in the immediate case, MacDonald J set them 
out clearly: ‘The effect of these decisions is that either the NHS Trust or the Gaslini Hospital 
in Italy (or another hospital) will have to continue to provide Tafida with life-sustaining 
treatment.’ A duty has been established to keep Tafida alive. If Tafida’s parents had decided at 
this point that they no longer wanted to travel to Italy, it seems that the Trust would have needed 
to continue life-sustaining treatment if no alternative provider could be found and provided 
there were no significant changes in Tafida’s condition. This is so notwithstanding the 
                                                     
63 ibid [178]. 
64 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, C-
36/02. We are grateful to Dr Barend van Leeuwen, Durham University for alerting us to this point when 
commenting on a previous draft. 
65 Haastrup (n 9) [83].  
66 Raqeeb (n 2) [178]. 
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pronunciation early in the judgment that: ‘The court has no power to require doctors to carry 
out a medical procedure against their own professional judgment.’67  
 
The two statements can be reconciled if the former is considered to represent a collective duty 
on the part of the Trust and the latter to refer to individual doctors: no individual doctor will be 
required by the court to treat against their professional view, but the position of the Trust as to 
Tafida’s best interests has been shown by the court to be erroneous. In these circumstances, 
this leads to a duty to maintain life-sustaining treatment.68 This has implications for moral 
distress for HCPs if it results in them treating contrary to widely held professional obligations.  
 
In this sense, Raqeeb opens up the potential to bypass certain judicial protections designed to 
enhance professional control of the treatment options open to patients in the UK. The court will 
not hear cases that are hypothetical in nature.69 MacDonald J’s assertion that all disputes are 
brought before the court70 can be contrasted with McFarlane LJ’s statement in Gard that it is 
‘conventional’ to do so.71 The argument that this should include hypothetical cases where no 
responsible HCP has been located who is willing to treat is dubious but not impossible. Given 
that ‘responsibility’ is not to be judged according to British standards and laws alone, we are 
likely to see an increasing number of disputes that would once have been considered 
hypothetical because no UK doctor would consider the proposed course of action to be in the 
child’s best interests based on domestic professional guidance and standards.  
 
Another issue is that consideration that ongoing or new treatment is in a child’s best interests 
in another country may lead to pressure to offer or continue it in the UK. An individual cannot 
require a Clinical Commissioning Group to fund treatment,72 but if a best interest determination 
is triggered then the paramount consideration will be the welfare of the child rather than 
resource implications. In circumstances where a duty to continue treatment is acknowledged 
by the court, there are cost implications for the NHS. The Science Media Centre records Julian 
Savulescu’s rapid response to the case as being a decision that is justified on the basis of 
distributive justice: 
 
There are independent good reasons to stop treatment based on justice: there are not 
enough resources in the NHS to indefinitely continue treatment for so little expected 
benefit. But this should not stop parents taking her to Italy at their own expense for 
continued treatment.73 
 
                                                     
67 ibid [115]. 
68 University Hospitals Birmingham NHSFT v HB [2018] EWCOP 39; Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch 
Hospitals NHS Trust v TG & OG [2019] EWCOP 21. See E Cave, ‘Selecting Treatment Options and Choosing 
Between them: Delineating Patient and Professional Autonomy in Shared Decision-Making’ Health Care Anal 
(2019) https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-019-00384-8.  
69 AVS v A NHS FT [2011] EWCA Civ 7. 
70 Raqeeb (n 2) [107]. 
71 Ibid [105].  
72 R v Cambridge District Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 1 WLR 898c. 
73 Science Media Centre (n 37).  
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But the judgment refers to a plan to return to the UK for long term ventilation at hospital or 
home and a likely future of increased physical deterioration will require further treatments.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The precedents of Gard and Evans demonstrate the limits of the court’s consideration of 
parental choice in making best interests determinations for children. The Raqeeb case turned 
on an unusual set of facts: it was considered that Tafida could not feel pain and would not be 
burdened by continued life which, according to Tafida’s religious and cultural upbringing in 
her first four years of life, was sacred. Compassion for the parents in this sad case will lead 
many to agree with the outcome. Our concern and focus have been on the articulation and 
application of the best interests test.  
 
Giles Birchley’s rapid response published by the Science Media Centre recognised the potential 
for this case to exacerbate the confrontational nature of debates around treatment where parents 
and HCPs cannot agree.74 We echo this concern. Condemnation, abuse and lack of trust of 
HCPs who stand in the way of parental choices has seen a marked rise. Free movement rights 
and a novel interpretation of best interests bring new scope to parental claims. A more worrying 
implication of this case would be that fewer disputes might arise because the media and the 
law have elevated parental rights (at least for those with sufficient knowledge, support and 
funds) to the extent that HCP obligations to act in the best interests of children are undermined. 
 
What concerns us in this case is not that a court can overrule the clinical view of overall best 
interests. That potential is the very purpose of the hearing. Rather, our fear is that the 
interpretation of the best interests test in Raqeeb raises the potential for Trusts to conclude that 
professional obligations to the child can be secondary to those to the parents. This flows from 
a novel approach to best interests in the judgment including: the separation of medical and 
overall best interests; the recognition of the relevance of international laws and frameworks to 
best interests determinations, notwithstanding their potential conflict with national judgments 
and professional guidelines; and reliance not on what Tafida could understand and express but 
on what she might in future have come to believe had she followed her parents’ religious 
beliefs.  
 
                                                     
74 ibid.  
